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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v, 
DANIEL K. RIGGS, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 970012-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or other infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
The fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides: 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law -- Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of laws. 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW, 
AND PRESERVATION BELOW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in giving instruction 
number 23, which allowed the jury to infer consciousness of guilt 
of automobile homicide from the fact that Mr. Riggs was fleeing 
prior to the fatal accident? 
Standard of review. 
We review the trial court's instructions to the 
jury for correctness, affording no deference. Ames v. 
Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah App. 1993). When 
conducting this analysis, we review the instructions in 
their entirety to determine whether the instructions, 
when considered as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on 
the applicable law. Id. "We reverse a trial court's 
decision on the basis of an instruction improperly 
submitted to the jury only where the party challenging 
the propriety of the instruction 'demonstrates prejudice 
stemming from the instructions viewed in the aggregate.'" 
Id. (quoting State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah 
App.1991), rev'd on other grounds, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 
1993)) . 
Salt Lake Citv v. Smoot. 921 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Utah App. 1996) . 
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Preserved below at R. 2166-8 (order re: record 
supplementation), see also R. 2158-61 (affidavit in support of 
supplementation).1 
2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to 
suppress Mr. Riggs1 un-Mirandized statement? 
Standard of Review. 
"The factual findings of a trial court that 
underlie its decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly 
erroneous." State v. Davis, 821 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah App. 
1991); accord State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 880 (Utah 
App. 1989). The trial court's "legal conclusions are 
reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion 
given to the trial judge's application of the legal 
standard to the facts." State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 
1247 (Utah App.) , cert, denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996) . 
State v. Wells, 928 P.2d 386, 388 (Utah App. 1996). 
Preserved below at R. 42-44 (motion), 79-100 (state's 
memorandum in opposition), 101-10 (Mr. Riggs' reply memorandum), 
982-1194 (evidentiary hearing transcript), 1195-1267 (argument, 
esp. at 1223-8), 1321-54 (hearing re: findings and conclusions), 
460-507 (findings and conclusions, attached as addendum C). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant Daniel K. Riggs was charged by information 
dated November 22, 1995 with three counts of automobile homicide 
and one count of receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle. R. 6-
10 (information). Mr. Riggs moved that the stolen vehicle count be 
inadvertently, the objection made in the trial court was not 
placed on the record. This Court granted appellant's motion to 
supplement the record, and the trial court found that the objection 
in fact had been made at trial and overruled. 
severed from the automobile homicide counts. R. 311-7. The trial 
court granted the motion. R. 396-7. 
Mr. Riggs moved that various un-Mirandized statements be 
suppressed. R. 42-44. The trial court entered detailed findings 
and conclusions, granting the motion in part and denying the motion 
in part. R. 460-507 (addendum C) , esp. at 502 (statements made to 
Trooper Bairett at scene of accident suppressed), 505-6 (statements 
to Deputies Hunter, Stratford, and Roesler not suppressed).2 
Mr. Riggs was tried by jury November 12-15, 1996 on the 
automobile homicide charges. See transcripts, R. 1407-1699 
(11/12/96), 1700-1955 (11/13/96), 1956-2020 (11/14/96), 2021-2093 
(11/15/96) . The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all three 
counts. R. 2083-4, 807, 812, 817. 
On November 19, 1996, Mr. Riggs pled conditionally guilty 
to receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle, reserving the right 
to appeal pretrial issues and errors at the automobile homicide 
trial. R. 859-60 (minute entry), 862-70 (statement of defendant). 
Mr. Riggs was sentenced to four consecutive prison terms of 1 to 15 
years, with restitution of $12,278.33. R. 912-5. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Riggs' charges stemmed from events occurring in the 
early morning hours of November 14, 1995. The information alleged 
that Mr. Riggs was driving a stolen 1992 Pord Ranger pickup truck 
2The statement to Deputy Roesler is not at issue in this 
appeal. 
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with license plates for a Geo Tracker. When Trooper Bairett 
attempted to make a traffic stop, the pickup attempted to evade. 
The truck ran a red light at 65-80 M.P.H., striking a 1992 Saturn. 
Both passengers in the Saturn as well as one passenger in the 
pickup died as a result of injuries sustained. Mr. Riggs' blood 
alcohol content was .13 percent as determined by a blood draw 
obtained within an hour and fifteen minutes of the accident. R. 6-
10 (information). 
Shortly before 6:00 P.M. on November 14, 1996, Deputy 
Stratford went to the hospital to see Mr. Riggs concerning some 
threats made by family members of the victims. R. 1123-4, 1126. 
Deputy Stratford decided that while he was there, he would also try 
to get Mr. Riggs1 side of the story concerning the incident. R. 
1124, 1132-3. No Miranda warning was given. R. 1124, 1135. 
Deputy Brad Hunter was also there at that time. R. 1124-5. Deputy 
Hunter testified that he was there with Deputy Stratford for "maybe 
five minutes." R. 1157. Deputy Stratford testified that all of 
Mr. Riggs1 statements were made within three or four minutes. R. 
1135. Deputy Stratford asked Mr. Riggs something akin to, "Do you 
remember the accident?" R. 1133. Mr. Riggs responded to the 
question. R. 1133. Deputy Stratford could not recall whether he 
asked follow-up questions. R. 1133-4. 
During the time that Deputy Stratford was there, Mr. 
Riggs made the following statements: 
He volunteered that he knew the car was stolen 
before the officer had turned his lights on and they 
decided to run from him. About that time the news had 
come on -- the television in his room was on and there 
5 
was a story about the accident. Mr. Riggs also made a 
spontaneous statement that he did not know the gun was 
loaded and that Kevin b[r3] ought it. He also said that 
he was just taking them home and knew nothing about the 
burglary earlier. 
R. 1125. 
Deputy Stratford said that at the time, he was not sure 
if Mr. Riggs was free to leave. R. 1127. He testified that he was 
not arrested until an hour or hour and a half later. R. 1159, 
116 0. When Mr. Riggs was taken to jail, he was booked in on 
warrants. R. 1129-30, Def. Exh. 6 (booking sheet). Mr. Riggs was 
still receiving medication on the 16th of November, slept during 
the day, and appeared to be groggy from medication at that time. 
R. 1143-4. 
Based on the evidence, the trial court made the following 
findings and conclusions: 
101. Based on his briefing with Trooper Bairett, 
Sergeant Craig and other law enforcement officers, Deputy 
Stratford was aware of considerable evidence regarding 
the likely cause of the collision and the possible use of 
alcoholic beverages by the defendant. 
102. Deputy Stratford observed beer cans in the 
collision debris. 
103. Deputy Stratford observed open beer cans 
within the cab of the pickup. 
104. Although not "100 percent" certain, after his 
briefing with the law enforcement officers, Deputy 
Stratford had a "strong idea" that the defendant was the 
driver of the pickup. 
208. Following some initial treatment and the blood 
draw on November 14, 1995, the defendant was transferred 
from Pioneer Valley Hospital to the University Medical 
Center ("UUMC"). 
3Although the suppression hearing transcript says "bought," 
this is a mistranscription. Deputy Stratford's police report and 
his preliminary hearing testimony both say "brought." In context, 
only brought makes sense. 
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209. Fairly soon after the defendant's admission to 
the UUMC on November 14, 1995, a UUMC representative 
contacted Deputy Stratford to tell him that the hospital 
had received threats against the defendant's life and 
that the hospital was concerned the defendant's family 
might remove him from the hospital against the hospital's 
wishes. 
210. In response, the defendant was provided 
protection by security guards, including deputies from 
the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, until he was 
released from the UUMC. 
211. The guards were stationed in the defendant's 
room also to ensure that the defendant did not leave the 
hospital. 
228. Before Deputy Hunter left, he and Deputy 
Stratford were together in the defendant's room for 
approximately five minutes. 
229. Deputy Hunter knew Deputy Stratford came to 
the defendant's room to "complete the investigation." 
232. Shortly before 6:00 P.M. on November 14, 1995, 
Deputy Stratford arrived at the defendant's room at the 
UUMC. 
233. Deputy Stratford went to the UUMC initially 
"to find out the problem with the threats" and then 
decided "that while [he] was there [he] would try and 
obtain [the defendant's] side of the story to find out 
[the defendant's] version of what happened." [brackets 
in original] 
234. Deputy Stratford did not advise the defendant 
of his rights per Miranda while he was present in the 
defendant's hospital room. 
235. Deputy Hunter was present in the defendant's 
room when Deputy Stratford arrived. 
236. Deputy Stratford was in uniform when he came 
to the defendant's room. 
237. When Deputy Stratford arrived, the defendant 
was talking to Deputy Hunter. 
238. Deputy Stratford asked the defendant "if he 
remembered the accident so that [Deputy Stratford] could 
find out [the defendant's] side of the story." [brackets 
in original] 
239. When Deputy Stratford arrived, the room's 
television was on. After Deputy Stratford asked the 
defendant if he remembered the accident, a television 
news story came on about the accident. 
240. Distracted by the news story, Deputies 
Stratford and Hunter turned to listen to it. 
241. At that time, according to Deputy Stratford, 
the defendant spontaneously stated that "he knew the car 
was stolen before the officer turned his lights on and 
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they decided to run from him;" "the gun was loaded and 
that Kevin b [r]ought it;" and that "he was just taking 
them home and knew nothing about the burglary earlier." 
242. The deputies themselves had turned to watch 
the news report and were not talking to the defendant 
when he made these statements. 
243. Deputy Stratford neither coerced nor tricked 
the defendant to make any statements. 
244. Although Deputy Stratford had asked a question 
about whether the defendant could remember the accident 
so that Deputy Stratford could fill out his version of 
events, the statement was not made in response to Deputy 
Stratford's question. 
245. Indeed, the question [sic] was not actually 
responsive to the question asked. 
246. Some of Deputy Stratford's testimony 
conflicted with some of his other testimony; however, he 
was, nevertheless, a credible witness. 
267. At the time the defendant allegedly made his 
incriminating statements to the officers, his medical 
condition did not appear to render him unable to make the 
statements to the officers knowingly and voluntarily. 
268. To the contrary, according to the officers, at 
each time the defendant volunteered one of these 
statements, the defendant had been engaged in casual 
conversations. 
269. Deputies Hunter, Stratford or Roesler neither 
tricked nor coerced the Defendant into making 
incriminating statements. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
17. The defendant was in custody at all times while 
he was at the UUMC. 
19. The law enforcement officers knew that the 
defendant was to remain in the hospital and that he was 
not going to leave the hospital. They were not obligated 
to arrest the defendant prior to his actual arrest. 
20. None of the conversations between the defendant 
and Deputies Hunter, Stratford and Roesler constituted 
interrogations nor did the deputies employ coercion or 
trickery to elicit incriminating statements from the 
defendant. 
21. All of the incriminating statements made by the 
defendant to Deputies Hunter, Stratford and Roesler were 
spontaneous and voluntary. 
22. At the times the defendant made his 
incriminating statements to Deputies Hunter, Stratford 
and Roesler, he made the statements knowingly and 
voluntarily; his medical condition did not render him 
incapable of making those statements knowingly and 
voluntarily. 
8 
R. 477, 493, 496-8, 501, 505-6 (addendum C). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in giving instruction 23 on flight. 
Any flight in this case occurred prior to commission of the alleged 
automobile homicides. Under Howland, the instruction was 
prejudicial error. 
The flight instruction set up an unconstitutional 
permissive inference in violation of Mr. Riggs' due process rights. 
The jury was permitted to infer guilt of automobile homicide from 
flight which occurred prior to commission of the charged offense. 
This error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The trial court erred in refusing to suppress un-
Mirandized statements made to Deputy Stratford!s custodial 
interrogation. Deputy Stratford testified the statements were in 
response to his questioning. Under the facts and controlling 
caselaw, the statements were obtained either directly in response 
to or through exploitation of custodial interrogation. This court 
should reverse, and permit Mr. Riggs to withdraw his conditional 
guilty plea to receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING THE 
FLIGHT INSTRUCTION.4 
4This issue affects not only the automobile homicide 
convictions at issue in the trial, but also the receiving or 
transferring a stolen vehicle conviction under Mr. Riggs' 
(continued...) 
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At trial on the automobile homicide charges, the trial 
court gave the jury instruction 23, which provided: 
The flight or attempted flight of a person 
immediately after the commission of a crime or after that 
person is accused of a crime that has been committed, is 
not sufficient in itself to establish the defendant's 
guilt. However, such flight, if proved, may be 
considered by you in light of all other proven facts in 
the case in determining guilt or innocence. 
Although consciousness of guilt may be inferred 
from flight, it does not necessarily reflect actual guilt 
of the crime charged, and there may be reasons for flight 
fully consistent with innocence. Therefore, whether or 
not evidence of flight shows a consciousness of guilt and 
the significance, if any, to be attached to any such 
evidence are matters exclusively within the province of 
the jury. 
R. 768 (addendum B). 
Defense counsel objected, arguing that as a matter of 
logic Mr. Riggs could not have a consciousness of guilt for a crime 
that had not yet been committed. R. 2166-8 (order re: record 
supplementation; R. 2158-61 (affidavit in support of 
supplementation). The trial court overruled the objection on the 
basis that the jury could properly infer that by fleeing, Mr. Riggs 
had consciousness that he was intoxicated. R. 2159. 
A. ANALYSIS UNDER UTAH FLIGHT INSTRUCTION 
CASELAW. 
Flight instructions have been improved in Utah where 
factually supported. E.g. State v. Bales, 675 P. 2d 573 (Utah 
4(...continued) 
conditional guilty plea. See R. 870 (actually the backside of R. 
869) (preserving M4) all other motions and issues raised during the 
defendant's trial on three counts of automobile homicide . . . ") . 
10 
1983) .5 However, to be factually supported the flight must occur 
after the crime charged. State v. Howland, 761 P. 2d 579 (Utah App. 
1988) directly addresses this issue. Howland became involved in a 
fist fight, then fled. After being run down by the other 
combatant, Howland attempted to draw a knife. The jury was 
instructed on flight as follows: 
Intentional flight by a defendant immediately 
after the commission of a crime is not sufficient in 
itself to establish guilt, but is a fact which, if 
proved, may be considered by the jury in the light of all 
other evidence in the case determining guilt or 
innocence. Whether or not evidence of flight shows a 
consciousness of guilt and the significance, if any, to 
be attached to any such evidence are matters exclusively 
within the province of the jury. 
Howland 761 P. 2d at 580. This instruction is almost 
indistinguishable from that here, substantively different only in 
that the Howland instruction did not incorporate the Bales 
admonitions set forth supra at 11 in footnote 5.6 
5Bales also required that any flight instruction also must 
incorporate the concepts that (1) there may be reasons for flight 
fully consistent with innocence, and (2) that even if consciousness 
of guilt is inferred from flight it does not necessarily reflect 
actual guilt of the crime charged. Bales, 675 P.2d at 575. The 
instruction at issue here adequately incorporates both concepts. 
6In redlined form, the instruction here involved the following 
changes to the Howland instruction: 
Intentional flight by a defendant^^^^^^^^ 
commission of a crime ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^P 
in itself to establish ^^^^^^^^^^^B guilt-—but ia a 
fact whichf| ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ P / if proved, may be 
considered by the jury^^ in fcfee light of all other 




The Court found the instruction to be error: 
We agree with appellant that it was error to 
give any flight instruction in this case because no 
flight occurred after commission of the crime charged." 
"It seems almost axiomatic that instructions must bear a 
relationship to evidence reflected in the record, and we 
cannot enjoy the luxury of sustaining a conviction on 
trite aphorism unsupported by any kind of evidence." 
State v. Pacheco, 27 Utah 2d 281, 495 P.2d 808, 808 
(1972). 
State v. Howland, 761 P.2d 579, 580 (Utah App. 1988). 
Because of this confusing and unnecessary 
instruction, the jury was likely misled into believing 
that the incident at the dumpster area -- at most a 
simple assault and a threat of future harm to persons 
other than Elliston -- met the elements of the crime 
charged, i.e., aggravated assault. 
Howland, 761 P.2d at 581. 
So here, giving the instruction was reversible error. At 
trial on the automobile homicide charges, the flight instruction 
was not factually supported and should not have been given. Mr. 
Riggs was not on trial for any crime committed prior to fleeing. 
Rather, he was on trial for deaths that occurred in the accident 
that occurred at the end of the flight. No consciousness of guilt 




or not evidence of flight shows a 
consciousness of guilt and the significance, if any, to 
be attached to any such evidence are matters 
exclusively within the province of the jury. 
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The trial court overruled the objection on the basis that 
the jury could properly infer that by fleeing, Mr. Riggs had 
consciousness that he was intoxicated. However, the instruction 
was not so limited. It referred to consciousness of guilt, not 
consciousness of intoxication. Even an inference of intoxication 
is misplaced. Under the specific facts of this case, involving a 
stolen truck, presence of a loaded weapon, and an earlier burglary, 
it is unlikely that the flight was the result of a consciousness of 
intoxication, rather than an attempt to avoid detection and 
prosecution on the other more serious offenses. 
Absent the improper flight instruction, there is a 
reasonable probability of a better result. In distinguishing 
between 2nd degree and 3rd degree felony automobile homicide, the 
jury was supposed to assess whether Mr. Riggs1 conduct was criminal 
negligent versus whether it was only negligent. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-207 (1995) . The improper flight instruction permitted an 
inference of a knowing mental state. It is entirely possible that, 
as a result of the flight instruction, the jury inferred criminal 
negligence was present because Mr. Riggs had a consciousness of 
guilt of automobile homicide. This Court should reverse. 
B. FEDERAL DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS. 
Additionally, the flight instruction violated Mr. Riggs1 
right to due process. It created a permissive inference from facts 
which do not warrant that inference. It allowed the jury to infer 
a consciousness of guilt of automobile homicide from the mere act 
of fleeing prior to commission of that offense. 
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The test for assessing permissive inferences is set forth 
in Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 
344 (1985): 
A permissive inference does not relieve the State of its 
burden of persuasion because it still requires the State 
to convince the jury that the suggested conclusion should 
be inferred based on the predicate facts proved. Such 
inferences do not necessarily implicate the concerns of 
Sandstrom [v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 61 
L.Ed.2d 39 (1979)] . A permissive inference violates the 
Due Process Clause only if the suggested conclusion is 
not one that reason and common sense justify in light of 
the proven facts before the jury. Ulster County Court[v. 
Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157-163, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224-2227, 
60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979)]. 
Id. at 314-5, 105 S.Ct. at 1971. 
The requisite mental states for 3rd degree and 2nd degree 
automobile homicide are negligence and criminal negligence. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-207(1) and -(2) (1995). The flight instruction 
invited the jury to infer a knowing mental state ("consciousness of 
guilt") from the act of fleeing. Thus, the jury was relieved of 
having to determine whether Mr. Riggs' conduct was criminally 
negligent, negligent, or non-negligent. A knowing mental state 
subsumes each of these lesser mental states. 
Here, reason and common sense do not justify the 
conclusion that the act of fleeing indicated that Mr. Riggs had a 
consciousness of guilt of a crime that he had not yet committed. 
Mr. Riggs' due process rights have been violated because the 
permissive inference suggests a conclusion that "is not one that 
reason and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before 
the jury." Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. at 315, 105 S. Ct. at 
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Because this error is of constitutional magnitude, 
Mr. Riggs is entitled to reversal unless the State can show the 
error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Tarafa. 720 
P.2d 1368, 1373 and n.21 (Utah 1986) (citing Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-11, reh'g 
denied, 386 U.S. 987, 87 S.Ct. 1283, 18 L.Ed.2d 241 (1967)); State 
v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204-05 (Utah 1987) (constitutional 
harmless error standard rather than evidentiary abuse of discretion 
standard is applicable where a constitutional right is impinged). 
This error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In distinguishing between 2nd degree and 3rd degree felony 
automobile homicide, the jury was supposed to assess whether Mr. 
Riggs1 conduct was criminal negligent versus whether it was only 
negligent. The improper flight instruction permitted an inference 
of a knowing mental state. It is entirely possible that, as a 
result of the flight instruction, the jury inferred criminal 
negligence was present because Mr. Riggs had a consciousness of 
guilt of automobile homicide. This Court should reverse. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
SUPPRESS THE UN-MIRANDIZED STATEMENTS MADE BY 
MR. RIGGS TO DEPUTY STRATFORD.7 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 
L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court held that before a person 
could be subjected to custodial interrogation, he or she must be 
7This issue affects only Mr. Riggs' conditional guilty plea to 
receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle. 
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informed of the right to remain silent, that anything said can and 
will be used against the individual in court, the right to consult 
with a lawyer and to have the lawyer present during interrogation, 
and that if indigent a lawyer will be appointed. Id. at 467-73, 86 
S.Ct. at 1624-7. Absent establishment of proof of such a warning 
by the prosecution, statements are inadmissible at trial. Id. at 
479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630. 
A. THE STATE HAS CONCEDED THAT MR. RIGGS WAS 
IN CUSTODY. 
As set forth in the statement of facts, while under guard 
by sheriff deputies at the hospital Mr. Riggs made incriminating 
statements to Deputy Stratford. The State has conceded that Mr. 
Riggs was in custody. R. 1205:6-14 (oral argument). In accord 
with both the facts and that concession, the trial court concluded 
that Mr. Riggs was in custody. Conclusion 17 (R. 505). 
B. DEPUTY STRATFORD INTERROGATED MR. RIGGS 
WITHOUT BENEFIT OF MIRANDA WARNINGS. 
The Supreme Court defined "interrogation" in Rhode Island 
v. Innis: 
We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come 
into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to 
either express questioning or its functional equivalent. 
That is to say, the term "interrogation" under Miranda 
refers not only to express questioning, but also to any 
words or actions on the part of the police (other than 
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the 
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response" from the suspect. 
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-1, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689-
90, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). 
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Here, there is no question that Mr. Riggs was subjected 
to express questioning. Deputy Stratford testified that his intent 
was to obtain Mr. Riggs' side of the story concerning the incident. 
R. 1124, 1132-3. He testified that he directly asked Mr. Riggs if 
he could remember the accident. R. 1133. This is express 
questioning. 
Likewise, there is no question that Mr. Riggs was not 
Mirandized. R. 1124, 1135, 497 (Stratford did not Mirandize him); 
1150, 1156, 494 (Hunter never Mirandized him) ; 1017 (Trooper 
Bairett never Mirandized him at the scene); 1046 (Deputy Roberts 
never Mirandized him). 
Thus, Mr. Riggs was subjected to custodial interrogation 
without benefit of Miranda warnings. 
C. STATEMENTS MADE TO DEPUTY STRATFORD WERE 
THE RESULT OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION. 
In light of all the facts and circumstances, the 
statements made to Deputy Stratford were the result of custodial 
interrogation. The trial court's purported factual findings and 
legal conclusions to the contrary are against the great weight of 
the evidence. 
It is undisputed that Deputy Stratford questioned Mr. 
Riggs prior to any statement. R. 1135. The total time frame was 
three or four minutes. R. 113 5. Deputy Stratford's testimony 
about the nature of Mr. Riggs1 statements is at best ambiguous. He 
agreed with the prosecutor's leading questions: 
Q And did Mr. Riggs make a spontaneous statement? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q Were you talking to Mr. Riggs at the time? 
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A No. He was talking to Deputy Hunter. 
Q Were you interrogating Mr. Riggs at the time? 
A No, I didn't. 
Q What was the spontaneous statement that Mr. 
Riggs made? 
A He volunteered that he knew the car was stolen 
before the officer had turned his lights on and they 
decided to run from him. About that time the news had 
come on -- the television in his room was on and there 
was a story about the accident. Mr. Riggs also made a 
spontaneous statement that he did not know the gun was 
loaded and that Kevin b [r] ought it. He also said that he 
was just taking them home and knew nothing about the 
burglary earlier. 
R. 1125:6-21. See also R. 1159 (responding affirmatively to 
leading question about "spontaneous statements"). However, this 
testimony was directly contradicted on cross-examination: 
Q And, in fact, you specifically asked him if he 
remembered the accident in order to find out his side of 
the story? 
A Yes, uh-huh. 
Q And that was stated to him in question form, 
something like, ["]Do you remember the accident? ["] 
A Yes. 
Q And you asked him follow-up questions about 
what he remembered about the accident. Correct? 
A I asked him if he remembered the accident so I 
could find out his side of the story, yeah. 
Q And my next question is, he responded to that. 
Correct? 
A Yes, uh-huh. 
Q And told you something of what he remembered? 
A Yes. 
Q And you asked follow-up questions to try and 
get some more details from him, did you not? 
A I don't recall if [I] asked any other follow-up 
questions or not. . . . 
R. 1133:6-25. 
The burden of establishing that Mr. Riggs' statements 
were voluntary and spontaneous was on the State. State v. Carter, 
776 P.2d 886, 890 (Utah 1989) ("State bears the burden of proving 
by at least a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant's 
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confession is voluntary"). Here, the fully marshalled evidence 
above shows that the State failed to meet that burden. 
The trial court provided no persuasive reason why Deputy 
Stratford's conflicting testimony should be resolved in favor of a 
finding of spontaneity. The questions asked by the prosecution 
were leading and conclusory. Naturally, a police officer will have 
a tendency to try to help the prosecution and hinder the defense. 
In light of these considerations, the concessions made on cross-
examination have more indicia of reliability. Absent a compelling 
reason, the trial court was not at liberty to discount only that 
testimony which favors Mr. Riggs: 
Certainly the court could not properly have admitted in 
evidence only the disserving statements by excluding the 
self-serving, and, when both were admitted, the jury 
could not be permitted to do what the court could not 
have done, consider only the disserving and reject the 
self-serving, or to believe the disserving and disbelieve 
the self-serving, unless there is something either 
intrinsic or extrinsic to render the self-serving 
questionable or doubtful or inconsistent. 
State v. Dunklev, 39 P.2d 1097, 1109 (Utah 1935), overruled on 
other grounds in State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178, 188 (Utah 1943) . 
Given Deputy Stratford's testimony that Mr. Riggs' remarks were in 
response to his questioning, the statements should have been 
suppressed as the result of un-Mirandized custodial interrogation. 
Even if there were a proper basis for ignoring Deputy 
Stratford's testimony that the statements were in response to his 
questioning, the State still failed to show that Mr. Riggs' 
statement was sufficiently attenuated from the prior illegal 
questioning. The total time frame was 3 or 4 minutes. R. 1133. 
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The factors that are relevant to determining 
the effect of previous police coercion have been spelled 
out in United States v. Patterson, 812 F.2d 1188, 1192 
(9th Cir. 1987) . They are whether (1) there was a break 
in the stream of events sufficient to insulate the 
statement from the effect of the prior coercion, (2) it 
can be inferred that the coercive practices had a 
continuing effect that touched the subsequent statement, 
(3) the passage of time, a change in the location of the 
interrogation, or a change in the identity of the 
interrogators interrupted the effect of the coercion, and 
(4) the conditions that would have precluded the use of 
a first statement had been removed. 
The application of these factors to the facts 
of the case at hand is similar to the task mandated by 
the Supreme Court in Wong Sun v. United States, 3 71 U.S. 
471 at 487-88, 83 S. Ct. 407 at 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) . 
We must determine "whether, granting establishment of the 
primary illegality, the evidence to which ... objection 
is made has been come at by exploitation of that 
illegality or instead by means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." 
(quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959)). Brown 
v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 
2261-62, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), also provides 
considerable guidance:" 
The question whether a confession is the product of 
a free will under Wong Sun must be answered on the 
facts of each case. No single fact is dispositive. 
The workings of the human mind are too complex, and 
the possibilities of misconduct too diverse, to 
permit protection of the Fourth Amendment to turn 
on ... a talismanic test. The Miranda warnings are 
an important factor, to be sure, in determining 
whether the confession is obtained by exploitation 
of an illegal arrest. But they are not the only 
factor to be considered. The temporal proximity of 
the arrest and the confession, the presence of 
intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the 
purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct 
are all relevant.... And the burden of showing 
admissibility rests, of course, on the prosecution, 
(citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). 
Collazo v. Estelle, 940 F.2d 411, 421 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc), 
cert, denied, 502 U.S. 1031, 112 S.Ct. 870, 116 L.Ed.2d 776 (1992) . 
In determining the validity of a confession or 
incriminating statements following police illegality, two 
inquiries must be made." First, the court must 
determine "voluntariness," i.e., whether the confession 
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was voluntary; second, the court must determine 
"attenuation," i.e., whether the confession was obtained 
in the course of police exploitation of the prior 
illegality or, in other words, whether the voluntary 
confession was sufficiently attenuated from the prior 
police misconduct to remove any taint. [] The confession 
must meet both tests to be admissible. 
State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 300 (Utah 1992) (footnote cites to 
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601-4, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2260-2, 45 
L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), et al, omitted). 
Applying the Collazo factors here, Mr. Riggs' statements 
were obtained by direct exploitation of the illegal questioning. 
There was no break in the stream of events sufficient to insulate 
the statement from the effect of the prior improper questioning. 
The television newscast about the accident only increased the 
pressure on Mr. Riggs to answer to Deputy Stratford. Second, it 
can easily be inferred that the coercive practices had a continuing 
effect that touched the statement. Indeed, Deputy Stratford 
testified that Mr. Riggs was responding to his question. R. 1133. 
Third, there was minimal passage of time, no change in location, 
and no change in identity of the interrogator. Finally, Mr. Riggs' 
un-Mirandized condition had not been removed. 
Under the similar Brown factors, the result is identical. 
First, no Miranda warnings were given. Second, the statements 
occurred almost immediately after the improper questioning. The 
total time frame was 3 to 4 minutes. Compare State v. McGrath, 928 
P. 2d 1033, 1038 (Utah App. 1996) ("The eight-month period elapsing 
before Ricks testified was significant and favors attenuation in 
the instant case."). 
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Third, the only possible intervening circumstance was the 
television news report of Mr. Riggs' accident. Significantly, this 
"intervening circumstance" only makes the situation worse. The 
newscast was such that, in light of the prior questioning, it would 
further prompt Mr. Riggs to respond to the pending question. Under 
Innis, the combined circumstance of the questioning followed 
immediately by the newscast are circumstances "that the police 
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response" from the suspect." Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S. Ct. at 
1689-90. The newscast acted as continued interrogation. 
Finally, the conduct was flagrant and directed at 
obtaining statements from Mr. Riggs. Deputy Stratford testified 
that his purpose was to obtain information from Mr. Riggs. Deputy 
Stratford's conduct was purposeful and direct. The result was 
anything but inadvertent. Under all the Brown factors, the 
statements were obtained as a direct result of the improper 
questioning: 
Where the misconduct is extreme, we will require a clean 
break in the chain of events between the misconduct and 
the consent to find the consent valid. For example, 
Justice Powell in Brown suggested that, where it appears 
from the facts that the police purposely engaged in the 
conduct to induce a confession, an intervening 
consultation with counsel or presentation before a 
magistrate may be required before the taint can be 
removed. 422 U.S. at 611, 95 S.Ct. at 2265-66 (Powell, 
J., concurring). 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1264 (Utah 1993). Mr. Riggs' 
statements should have been suppressed. 
Pope v. Zenon, 69 F.3d 1018 (Or. 1995) is illustrative. 
Officers interrogated Pope prior to Mirandizing him. He made 
22 
incriminating remarks. After being read his rights, he asked a 
question concerning the right to counsel, and then launched 
directly into making incriminating remarks. 6 9 F.3d at 1020-22. 
The court rejected any contention that, under these facts, the 
confession was spontaneous and voluntary: 
[T]o argue that Mr. Pope just blurted out a confession 
after being advised of his rights simply distorts the 
facts. As demonstrated by the quoted record, we have no 
difficulty concluding that Mr. Pope's so-called 
"spontaneous statements" were directly induced by 
Detectives McDonald's and Perry's prohibited 
interrogation tactics. Any alleged state court finding 
of fact to the contrary is clearly erroneous, and any 
conclusion of law that Mr. Pope's confession was not the 
product of interrogation, but "volunteered" as defined in 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1629, and Edwards 
v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 
L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), is equally wrong. 
Pope v. Zenon, 69 F.3d at 1024. 
Mr. Riggs' statements were made in response to improper 
un-Mirandized custodial interrogation. The trial court's findings 
and conclusions to the contrary should be reversed. Specifically, 
finding 244, that "the statement was not made in response to Deputy 
Stratford's question," R. 498, is directly contradicted by Deputy 
Stratford's testimony to the contrary, R. 1133. Finding 245, that 
the statement "was not actually responsive to the question asked," 
R. 4 98, is not well taken. Asked what he recalled of the accident, 
Mr. Riggs responded with details surrounding the accident. It was 
responsive. Conclusion 20, that "None of the conversations . . . 
constituted interrogations," R. 505-6, is incorrect. Both the 
direct questioning about the accident and the TV newscast 
constituted interrogation. Finally, conclusion 21, that the 
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statements were spontaneous and voluntary, R. 506, is contrary to 
Collazo, Brown, Pope, and Deputy Stratford's testimony at R. 1133. 
The trial court should be reversed. 
D. NO PREJUDICE NEED BE SHOWN BECAUSE THIS 
ISSUE IS RAISED PURSUANT TO A CONDITIONAL 
GUILTY PLEA. 
This suppression issue, concerning Mr. Riggs' statements 
about the stolen truck, is raised pursuant to a conditional guilty 
plea. The stolen truck charge has never gone to trial. No harmful 
error analysis is possible. State v. Lindqren, 910 P. 2d 1268, 1274 
(Utah App. 1996) (in conditional plea context, appellate court must 
presume prejudice). Cf. Rule 11 (i), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (remedy for error is withdrawal of plea). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Riggs respectfully requests 
that his convictions be reversed. The automobile homicide 
convictions should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings 
due to the improper flight instruction, and Mr. Riggs should be 
permitted to withdraw his conditional plea of guilty to the 
receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle charge. The trial 
court's order denying suppression of statements made to Deputy 
Stratford should be reversed, and Mr. Riggs should be permitted to 
withdraw his conditional guilty plea to receiving or transferring 
a stolen vehicle. 
24 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ fc day of January, 1999, 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
LISA J. REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
RALPH W. DELLAPIANA 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused 
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, Heber 
M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, 
ft 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this ^6 day of January, 1999. 
Robert K. Heineman 
DELIVERED/MAILED this day of January, 1999 
25 
ADDENDUM A 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE (COMMITMENT), R. 912-5 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 










Count No. ' - j 
Hnnnrahlp AlArv- /SA. <=4< rkx^ 
Clerk r V ~T~UprKv^ 
Reporter £ . \S['A^or\ 
Bailiff t j l v / i ^ 
D The motion of . to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is • granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by (jta jury: D the court; • plea of guilty; 
D plea of ng contest; of the offense of A u ^ r V ^ O ^ i l e H p m l C J < ^ & a felony 
of the -^ i *s rdegree^ a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by L k-W/vv^ , and the State being represented by 1£« L ^ f l r t a r*>*3s now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
years and which may be for life; D to a maximum mandatory term of 
D not to exceed five years; 
IX of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ ; ^ i 
% and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ | ^ j A T f c T o N t t c r n n n ^ 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
JX such sentence is to run consecutively with n\^X CVC>IA.KVH> 
D upon motion of D State, Q Defense, D Court, Count(s) 
D 
are hereby dismissed. 
• Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( • prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
JS( Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County-S*for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant ~~~ 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
JS Commitment shall issue 
DATED this —* day of 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DISTRICT COURT J U t j £ E > * ~ 
"**"£L 
Defense Counsel tf'irosi? 
Deputy County Attorney Page 4_0,-i 
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D not to exceed five years; 
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J$ and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $_ 
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• such sentence is to run concurrently with 
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D upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s) 
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are hereby dismissed. 
• Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( • prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
-6? Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County &Tor delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. ' 
JSfc Commitment shall issue 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DATED this ^A day of ^ 
Defense Counsel 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
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THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
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Count No. 3 
Honorable ftf A ^ I V ML 6h/Wg| 
Clerk r l - ' T ' h g r n g , 
Reporter C - W » l^PC\ 
Bailiff K l u i g . 
Defendant. Date Cforuijar\| ^ j l ^ T ) 
D The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is • granted • denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by p£a jury; D the court; D plea of guilty; 
D plea of nd> contest; of the offense of A u f o l f o p k i [g, \\p prW-i <jreK , a felony 
of the ^^Ytagr t t f l n a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by l~- K < ^ ^ \ , and the State being represented hy Id. (>t jv lgy o ^ is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
D to a maximum mandatory term of 
G not to exceed five years; 
fit of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
• of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
• not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $. 
years and which may be for life; 
2 ^ \ 
itf and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $_ to 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
JS such sentence is to run consecutively with frVKgJ^ ( l o u r v r ^ 
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and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
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of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
D to a maximum mandatory term of 
D not to exceed five years; 
$ of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ 
. years and which may be for life; 
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are hereby dismissed. 
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( • prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
^ Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County Jtffor delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordarvo^ with this Judgment and Commitment. ~~ 
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Deputy County Attorney Page 
0 8 1 5 
(White—Court) (Green—Judge) (Yellow—Jail/Pnson/AP&P) (Pink—Defense) (Goldenrod—State) 
ADDENDUM B 
FLIGHT INSTRUCTION, R. 768 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^°> 
The flight or attempted flight of a person immediately after 
the commission of a crime or after that person is accused of a 
crime that has been committed, is not sufficient in itself to 
establish the defendant's guilt. However, such flight, if 
proved, may be considered by you in light of all other proven 
facts in the case in determining guilt or innocence. 
Although consciousness of guilt may be inferred from flight, 
it does not necessarily reflect actual guilt of the crime 
charged, and there may be reasons for flight fully consistent 
with innocence. Therefore, whether or not evidence of flight 
shows a consciousness of guilt and the significance, if any, to 
be attached to any such evidence are matters exclusively within 
the province of the jury. 
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FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS, R. 460-507 
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JUN 28/1996 
^ Oeoutv Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
-vs- : CASE NO. 961900273 
DANIEL K. RIGGS, : JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA 
Defendant. : 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
two motions of defendant, Daniel K. Riggs: (1) ''Motion to Suppress 
Blood Draw Evidence" and (2) "Motion to Suppress Defendant's 
Statements". 
On April 26, 1996, an evidentiary hearing on the two motions 
was held before the Court at which time the defendant was present 
and represented by counsel Lisa J. Remal and Susanne Gustin-Furgis, 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association. The State of Utah was 
represented by Kenneth R. Updegrove, Deputy District Attorney. At 
the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the Court ordered 
additional briefing and scheduled oral argument by the parties on 
May 10, 1996. 
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At the May 10 oral argument, the defendant was again present 
and represented by Ms. Remal and Ms. Gustin-Furgis. Additionally, 
Ralph Dellapiana, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, also argued 
in behalf of the defendant. The State of Utah was again 
represented by Mr. Updegrove. At the conclusion of the oral 
argument, the Court ruled from the bench on all issues and ordered 
Mr. Updegrove to prepare proposed findings of fact and conclusions 
of law.1 
thereafter, defendant's counsel received the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
and submitted written objections to them. At a hearing on June 4, 1996, attended by the defendant 
and counsel for both parties, the Court ruled on the objections and proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. A second draft of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law was then 
prepared. The Court has now carefully reviewed the second draft, re-read the transcript of the 
suppression hearing, made numerous changes to the second draft and hereby renders these findings 
of fact and conclusions of law. 
Because of limitations of time and resources, the Court has not specified the various citations 
to the suppression hearing transcript to which the findings correspond. Indeed, evidence regarding 
certain events such as, for example, the probable cause evidence known by a particular officer at a 
particular time, may be addressed at several different places throughout the transcript according to 
what the officer himself said and also to what other officers said they told to the officer. 
Further, specific findings may vary somewhat from the exact language used by a witness at 
one location in the transcript. Where this occurs, the variation results from the Court's review of all 
of the evidence concerning the subject matter addressed, the weight of the evidence, the inferences 
that can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, if appropriate, and the reasonable reconciliation of 
conflicts in the evidence, if appropriate. Thus, consideration of all of the evidence has been given in 
rendering these findings of fact. 
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DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS 
A. Blood Draw Test Results 
Turning first to the defendant's claims regarding the blood 
draw evidence, he seeks to suppress two different blood alcohol 
test results of blood drawn from him: (1) the "state-analyzed" 
blood drawn by the State's phlebotomist, Bryan Davis ("Mr. Davis"), 
and analyzed by the State's toxicologist, Bruce Beck ("Mr. Beck"); 
and (2) the "hospital-analyzed" blood drawn by Mr. Davis at the 
request of Pioneer Hospital and analyzed by the Pioneer Valley 
Hospital Laboratory. 
As to the state-analyzed blood, the defendant claims the blood 
alcohol results of the defendant's blood samples are inadmissible 
because (1) the defendant was not under arrest and did not give his 
consent to his blood being drawn, the blood draw constitutes an 
unconstitutional search under both the United States Constitution 
and the Constitution of the State of Utah; (2) the chain of custody 
of the state-analyzed blood was defective; (3) the manner in which 
the state-analyzed blood was stored by Mr. Davis and stored and 
tested by Mr. Beck; and (4) only the law enforcement officer who 
was present at the hospital with the defendant could have ordered 
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the defendant's blood to be drawn, and he did not have probable 
cause to do so.2 
As to the hospital-analyzed blood, the defendant claims the 
blood alcohol results are inadmissible because (1) the blood draw 
constitutes an unconstitutional search; and (2) the results 
constitute privileged information under the physician-patient 
provisions of Rule 506 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
B. Defendant's Alleged Statements 
Defendant has also moved to suppress incriminating statements 
he allegedly made to different law enforcement officers on several 
different occasions on the grounds that (1) these statements were 
taken in violation of his rights under the United States 
Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Utah; and (2) 
because of the injuries he received in the automobile collision and 
resulting medical treatment, any such statements made by him were 
made neither knowingly nor voluntarily. 
C. Burden of Proof 
It is undisputed that the State of Utah has the burden of 
proof in this proceedings. 
2The Court has by its Memorandum Decision dated May 17, 1996, resolved this issue. 
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The Court, having considered the weight of the oral and 
documentary evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, the 
inferences that can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the 
written and oral arguments of all counsel, and because good cause 
has been shown, hereby enters the following findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant is charged by Information with Count I, 
Criminal Homicide, Automobile Homicide; Count II, Criminal 
Homicide, Automobile Homicide; Count III, Criminal Homicide, 
Automobile Homicide; and Count IV, Receiving or Transferring a 
Stolen Motor Vehicle, Trailer, or Semitrailer. 
2. The Information is based upon defendant's alleged 
criminal activity on November 14, 2995, at approximately 3:30 a.m., 
2200 West 5400 South, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL TROOPER DAVID BAIRETT 
3. On November 14, 1995, at approximately 3:31 a.m., while 
on patrol duty, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper David Bairett ("Trooper 
Bairett") was stopped at the traffic control signal at 5400 South 
Redwood Road, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
4. Trooper Bairettfs marked patrol vehicle then faced west. 
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5. Trooper Bairett noticed a red Ford pickup truck 
("pickup") approach him from the rear at a high rate of speed. 
6. The pickup stopped at the red light in the lane next to 
Trooper Bairett, 
7. Trooper Bairett looked at the driver of the pickup from 
a distance of approximately eight to ten feet. 
8. The lighting was sufficient for Trooper Bairett to see 
the features of the driver of the pickup. 
9. When the light turned green, the pickup proceeded west 
across Redwood Road at approximately 25 miles per hour. 
10. The speed limit on 5400 South at that location is 45 
miles per hour. 
11. Trooper Bairett slowed his patrol vehicle so that the 
driver of the pickup was forced to proceed ahead of Trooper 
Bairett. 
12. Trooper Bairett was able to observe that the registration 
on the pickup's rear license plate had expired. 
13. Trooper Bairett read the license plate number to Dispatch 
and was subsequently informed that the plate was not registered to 
the pickup. 
14. Trooper Bairett decided to stop the pickup. 
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15. The pickup turned south from 5400 South onto 2200 West. 
16. At that point 2200 West is a dead-end street, ending in 
a cul-de-sac. 
17. The speed limit on 2200 West where the pickup turned 
southbound is 25 miles per hour. 
18. Following the pickup, Trooper Bairett also turned his 
patrol vehicle southbound onto 2200 West. 
19. Trooper Bairett activated the overhead lights on his 
patrol vehicle. 
20. The pickup accelerated and began to pull away from 
Trooper Bairett. 
21. The pickup entered the cul-de-sac. 
22. While the pickup was in the cul-de-sac, Trooper Bairett 
attempted to block its path with his patrol vehicle; however, the 
pickup maneuvered between the patrol vehicle and some mail boxes 
and, by driving over the front lawns of two residences, was able to 
exit the cul-de-sac, turn north and get back onto 2200 West. 
23. By the time Trooper Bairett was able to turn his patrol 
car around to follow the pickup, the pickup was approximately 200 
yards ahead of Trooper Bairett, still heading northbound on 2200 
West. 
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24. Trooper Bairett proceeded northbound after the pickup; 
however, even at a speed of approximately 75 miles per hour, 
Trooper Bairett was unable to narrow substantially the distance 
between him and the pickup. 
25. Trooper Bairett observed that the traffic control signal 
ahead of the pickup at the intersection of 5400 South and 2200 West 
was red. 
26. Based upon his experience that most vehicles slow at red 
lights and because he observed the pickup's brake lights come on 
briefly, Trooper Bairett thought the pickup would stop at the red 
light. 
27. However, the pickup did not stop; instead, it entered the 
intersection when the light facing it was red. 
28. As the pickup entered the intersection, Trooper Bairett 
was located approximately 150 yards to the south on 2200 West. 
29. As the pickup entered the intersection northbound, a 
Saturn passenger vehicle entered the intersection westbound at a 
speed of approximately 40 miles per hour. 
30. The pickup and Saturn collided near the middle of the 
intersection. 
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31. The force of the impact caused the pickup to roll; it 
came to rest upside down on its top. 
32. The Saturn crashed into a greenhouse before it came to 
rest. 
33. Trooper Bairett proceeded directly to the collision scene 
and radioed for assistance from the Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Office. 
34. Trooper Bairett observed considerable debris from the 
collision. 
35. Trooper Bairett observed unopened beer cans in the 
intersection. 
36. Trooper Bairett observed a male exit the rear window of 
the pickup. 
37. Trooper Bairett took that male into custody, handcuffed 
him and placed him in front of the patrol vehicle. 
38. Trooper Bairett also observed that the individual he had 
earlier seen driving the vehicle was partially pinned on the 
passenger side of the upside-down pickup. 
39. Trooper Bairett identified the man he had seen driving 
the pickup at 5400 South Redwood Road as the defendant, Daniel K. 
Riggs. 
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40. Trooper Bairett noticed the defendant had a head injury 
which was bleeding, but not profusely. 
41. To Trooper Bairett, the defendant appeared to be in 
shock. 
42. The defendant mumbled, answered questions and made 
statements. 
43. Later, while the defendant was still at the collision 
scene, it appeared to Trooper Bairett that the defendant's 
condition improved. 
44. Trooper Bairett detected an odor of an alcoholic beverage 
coming from the defendant. 
45. Trooper Bairett acknowledged that a head injury can cause 
someone to appear intoxicated and yet not be; however, because of 
the defendant's appearance and the sound of his voice, Trooper 
Bairett believed the defendant, notwithstanding his head injury, 
was, in fact, intoxicated. 
46. Trooper Bairett told the defendant that help was on the 
way and to remain still. 
47. Trooper Bairett proceeded to the greenhouse to attempt to 
assess the injuries of those in the Saturn. 
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48. Trooper Bairett also found an individual who had been 
ejected from the pickup on the ground. 
49. Trooper Bairett returned to the defendant at the pickup. 
50. Trooper Bairett asked the defendant who was driving the 
pickup. 
51. Trooper Bairett asked the defendant why the defendant had 
run from him and why he was driving. 
52. In response, the defendant told Trooper Bairett that he 
was driving because "everybody else was too drunk to drive." 
53. Trooper Bairett had not informed the defendant of his 
Miranda rights prior to questioning him. 
54. Trooper Bairett requested Dispatch to send additional 
help "for blood draw purposes as well as traffic control at the 
scene." 
55. Trooper Bairett has been with the Utah Highway Patrol 
just over three years. 
56. Trooper Bairett was trained at POST to recognize drunk 
drivers. 
57. Prior to November 14, 1995, Trooper Bairett had made 
approximately 80-85 DUI arrests. 
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58. Trooper Bairett believed there was the potential for some 
of those involved in the collision to die because of their 
injuries. 
59. Trooper Bairett determined to have blood drawn from the 
defendant. 
60. Trooper Bairett did not leave the collision scene because 
of his duties. 
61. Trooper Bairett spoke to "one or more" Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's deputies ("deputies") after they responded to the 
collision scene. 
62. In particular, Trooper Bairett spoke with Sergeant Delwin 
L. Craig ("Sergeant Craig") and to Deputy Lawrence Stratford 
("Deputy Stratford"). 
63. Trooper Bairett described to Deputy Stratford what he had 
observed and his concerns. 
64. Trooper Bairett did not arrest the defendant at the 
collision scene. 
SERGEANT DELWIN L. CRAIG 
65. On November 14, 1995, at approximately 3:40 a.m., 
Sergeant Craig responded to the collision scene. 
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66. Sergeant Craig observed the two vehicles involved in the 
collision and the debris strewn about. 
67. The debris Sergeant Craig observed included beer cans, 
candy bars, cigarettes, a rifle and vehicle parts. 
68. Sergeant Craig observed a body lying in a grassy area, a 
body lying inside the truck, two occupants in the Saturn and "two 
others outside the vehicles sitting." 
69. Sergeant Craig treated the area of the collision as a 
crime scene and placed deputies at specific locations. 
70. Sergeant Craig spoke very briefly with Trooper Bairett, 
at which time Trooper Bairett told Sergeant Craig that he had tried 
to stop the pickup and that the pickup "took off on him" and then 
collided with the Saturn in the intersection. 
71. Trooper Bairett pointed out the defendant to Sergeant 
Craig and stated that the defendant was the driver of the pickup. 
72. Sergeant Craig spoke to the defendant. 
73. Sergeant Craig was told at the scene by EMT's that the 
defendant's head injury was worse than it looked. 
74. Sergeant Craig acknowledged that a head injury could 
cause some disorientation. 
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75. Sergeant Craig got "very close" to the defendant and 
observed that the defendant was "shaken up" and had bloodshot eyes. 
76. When he was "probably within one foot of the defendant," 
Sergeant Craig noticed the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming 
from the defendant. 
77. Sergeant Craig asked Deputy Lonnie Wilson to remain with 
the defendant. 
78. Sergeant Craig called East Patrol and requested the 
assistance of a deputy to witness the defendant's blood draw. 
79. Sergeant Craig believed he had enough information and 
evidence to justify the defendant's blood being drawn. 
Specifically, the information he had included that he 
a. saw the pickup on its roof; 
b. observed the Saturn lodged in the side of the 
greenhouse; 
c. observed the beer cans strewn about; 
d. knew that Trooper Bairett had tried to stop the 
pickup and that the pickup "took off on [Trooper 
Bairett]" and then collided with the Saturn in the 
intersection; 
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e. knew from Trooper Bairett that the defendant was 
the driver of the pickup; 
f. got "very close" to the defendant; 
g. noticed the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming 
from the defendant; 
h. observed that the defendant was "shaken up" and had 
bloodshot eyes; 
I. spoke to the defendant; 
j. observed the defendant's head wound but believed, 
nevertheless, that the defendant was intoxicated; 
k. was aware that there were going to be some 
fatalities from the collision. 
80. As of November 14, 1995, Sergeant Craig had been an 
officer with the Salt Lake County Sheriff's office for seven years. 
81. Prior to November 14, 1995, Sergeant Craig had been 
trained to recognize intoxicated drivers. 
82. As of November 14, 1995, Sergeant Craig had been involved 
in approximately 70 DUI arrests. 
83. In response to Sergeant Craig's request for a deputy to 
witness the blood draw on defendant, Deputy Craig Don Roberts 
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("Deputy Roberts''), arrived at the collision scene to carry out 
that responsibility. 
DEPUTY CRAIG DON ROBERTS 
84. When Deputy Roberts arrived, the defendant was secured 
onto a stretcher by straps and was waiting to be loaded into an 
ambulance. 
85. Deputy Roberts was present at the collision scene very 
briefly ("a minute or two," "just about a minute"). 
86. While he was at the scene, Deputy Roberts observed 
several patrol vehicles, ambulances and paramedics. 
87. Deputy Roberts observed the pickup and Saturn which had 
been involved in the collision. 
88. Deputy Roberts observed the debris in the immediate area. 
89. The debris included beer cans and vehicle parts. 
90. Deputy Roberts spoke with an officer on the scene, Deputy 
Jason Jones, who explained to Deputy Roberts that the driver of the 
pickup had "blown the intersection and hit the red car sending it 
into the building. And that the person [Roberts] was supposed to 
go watch, this Daniel Riggs, was the one that was driving the 
truck." 
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91. Sergeant Craig directed Deputy Roberts to go to Pioneer 
Valley Hospital and "witness" the blood draw on the defendant. 
92. Deputy Roberts then followed the ambulance to the 
hospital. 
93. Prior to November 14, 1995, Deputy Roberts had worked in 
law enforcement for the Midvale City Police Department for almost 
four years. 
94. Deputy Roberts has been with the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's office for just over a year. 
95. At the time of the collision, Deputy Roberts had training 
in the apprehension of intoxicated drivers through POST, understood 
how to use the intoxalyzer and was experienced in performing field 
sobriety tests. 
96. Deputy Roberts has made " [p]robably a couple hundred [DUI 
arrests] in the last five years." 
DEPUTY LAWRENCE STRATFORD 
97. Deputy Stratford arrived at the collision scene on 
November 14, 1995, shortly after the ambulance carrying the 
defendant left for the hospital. 
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98. Detective Stratford was responsible for heading the 
collision investigation team and "took charge" of the investigation 
when he arrived at the scene. 
99. Deputy Stratford was briefed at the scene by Trooper 
Bairett, Sergeant Craig and other law enforcement officers. 
100. Trooper Bairett described his observations and concerns 
to Deputy Stratford. 
101. Based on his briefing with Trooper Bairett, Sergeant 
Craig and other law enforcement officers, Deputy Stratford was 
aware of considerable evidence regarding the likely cause of the 
collision and the possible use of alcoholic beverages by the 
defendant. 
102. Deputy Stratford observed beer cans in the collision 
debris. 
103. Deputy Stratford observed open beer cans within the cab 
of the pickup. 
104. Although not "100 percent" certain, after his briefing 
with the law enforcement officers, Deputy Stratford had a "strong 
idea" that the defendant was the driver of the pickup. 
105. According to Sergeant Craig, Deputy Stratford ordered the 
blood draw on the defendant. 
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106. Deputy Stratford requested Sergeant Craig to send 
deputies to witness blood draws on the defendant, Michael Lambrou, 
Lonnie James, and Kevin Smithson. 
107. Michael Lambrou and Lonnie James had been in the Saturn; 
Kevin Smithson had been in the pickup. 
108. As of November 14, 1995, Deputy Stratford was a law 
enforcement officer with the Salt Lake County Sheriff's office. 
109. As of November 14, 1995, Deputy Stratford had worked for 
the Salt Lake County Sheriff for approximately 12 years. 
110. As of November 14, 1995, Deputy Stratford was assigned to 
the Traffic Division as an investigator. 
THE DEFENDANT'S BLOOD DRAW 
111. Subsequent to the arrival of Deputy Roberts at the 
hospital, he and the state's phlebotomist, Bryan Davis ("Mr. 
Davis") , together went into the emergency room where the defendant 
lay. 
112. When Deputy Roberts and Bryan Davis entered the 
defendant's emergency room, the straps which had secured the 
defendant to the stretcher had been removed and the defendant had 
been moved from the stretcher to a hospital bed. 
113. The defendant was awake and appeared to be coherent. 
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114. Deputy Roberts told the defendant they "were there to do 
a blood draw." 
115. Deputy Roberts did not tell the defendant the blood was 
for police purposes. 
116. In response to Deputy Roberts' statement, the defendant 
voiced no objection. 
117. The defendant did not indicate that Deputy Roberts and 
Mr. Davis could proceed with the blood draw. 
118. No search warrant authorizing the blood draw was obtained 
prior to the drawing of the defendant's blood. 
119. Deputy Roberts observed that the defendant had a head 
wound and that there was blood on his head. 
120. From a distance of approximately one foot, Deputy Roberts 
smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage on the defendant's 
breath; however, he did not notice any slurring of speech by the 
defendant. 
121. Throughout the time Deputy Roberts observed the defendant 
at the hospital, the defendant was "pretty well doing everything 
that the nurses asked him to do." 
122. As time passed between 4:46 a.m. and 6:30 a.m. on 
November 14, 1995, to Deputy Roberts "[it] seemed that [the 
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defendant] got better and was more alert and was more able to move 
around and do the things that [the nurses] asked him to do." 
123. Deputy Roberts was aware that fatalities were involved in 
the collision. 
124. Deputy Roberts was aware that blood draws were also being 
performed on other individuals involved in the collision. 
125. Deputy Roberts did not arrest the defendant at Pioneer 
Valley Hospital. 
CHAIN OF CUSTODY AND STORAGE OF THE STATE-ANALYZED BLOOD 
126. Bryan Davis is a phlebotomist on contract with law 
enforcement agencies throughout Salt Lake County to draw blood from 
suspects at the request of law enforcement officers. 
127. Mr. Davis is familiar with the provisions of Section 41-
6-44 Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended. 
128. On November 14, 1995, Mr Davis was qualified and 
authorized by the Utah State Health Department pursuant to Utah law 
to perform blood draws in behalf of the State on DUI suspects and 
he had been so qualified and authorized for approximately 11 years. 
129. During the last approximately 12 years, Mr. Davis has 
performed over 9,000 evidentiary draws. 
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130. Mr. Davis testified that he consistently follows standard 
procedures in the performance, handling and storage of evidentiary 
blood draws. 
131. In this case, Mr. Davis followed his standard, consistent 
procedures in the performance, handling and storage of the 
defendant's blood draw evidence. 
132. The procedures followed by Mr. Davis in this and his 
other evidentiary blood draws are that he 
a. obtains the blood; 
b. encloses the blood in glass vacutainer tubes; 
c. individually marks the tubes with the defendant's 
name, Mr. Davis' initials, the date of the blood 
draw and the time of the blood draw; 
d. places the tubes into an envelope which contains 
virtually the same information, along with some 
information regarding the police agency's case and 
deputies or officers involved in the accident; 
e. seals the envelope by a gum seal and tapes over the 
seal; 
f. has the officer witnessing the seal sign on the 
back of the envelope; and 
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g. maintains the envelope containing the tubes in his 
possession or under secure conditions until he can 
deliver it to the State forensic toxicologist. 
133. The tubes into which the blood is drawn contain 
preservative, or anticoagulant, agents: one tube contains sodium 
fluoride and the second contains potassium oxalate. 
134. On the morning on November 14, 1995, Mr. Davis went to 
Pioneer Valley Hospital to draw the defendant's blood. 
135. Mr. Davis did, in fact, draw the defendant's blood. 
13 6. Mr. Davis prepared the defendant's arm for the blood draw 
by cleansing the area with a soap and water solution. 
137. Mr. Davis stated it was "probable" he moved the 
defendant's arm out to draw the blood and then drew the blood. 
138. It is undisputed that Mr. Davis performed the blood draw 
in a reasonable and safe manner. 
139. It took Mr. Davis approximately three minutes to complete 
the blood draw. 
140. As the blood was being drawn, the defendant neither 
withdrew his arm nor voiced an objection to the procedure. 
141. At the same time Mr. Davis drew the defendant's blood for 
state-analysis, either Mr. Davis or a nurse from Pioneer Hospital 
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drew three additional tubes of the defendant's blood for his 
medical treatment. 
142. Thus, a combined total of five tubes of blood were drawn 
from the defendant: two for state-analysis and three for hospital-
analysis. 
143. The tubes of blood drawn for the State were marked with 
the defendant's name, the date and time and Mr. Davis1 initials. 
144. Mr. Davis then sealed the tubes of blood in an envelope 
and taped over the seal. 
145. Deputy Roberts signed the back of the envelope over the 
taped seal. 
14 6. After leaving the hospital, Mr. Davis placed the envelope 
containing the vials of blood drawn from the defendant in a 
container in his locked motor vehicle. 
147. The container into which Mr. Davis placed the envelope is 
a non-refrigerated cooler which Mr. Davis had positioned in his 
vehicle for the purpose of holding blood draw evidence. 
148. The cooler is not locked. 
149. Mr. Davis then drove to LDS Hospital, Cottonwood Hospital 
and the University of Utah Medical Center to perform similar blood 
draws. 
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150. Mr. Davis locked his vehicle when he exited. 
151. The container in the vehicle did not need to be 
refrigerated because the tubes into which the blood had been drawn 
contained preservatives which temporarily protect the blood against 
deterioration. 
152. According to Mr. Davis, blood protected by preservatives 
is commonly sent by mail throughout the country in unrefrigerated 
packages. 
153. Dennis Crouch, the defendant's forensic toxicologist 
expert witness ("Mr. Crouch"), agreed that blood protected by 
preservatives is often sent by mail throughout the country in 
unrefrigerated packages. 
154. The fact the defendant's blood was temporarily placed in 
the unrefrigerated cooler did not affect the accuracy of the blood 
alcohol content results. 
155. When he had performed all of the blood draws that 
morning, Mr. Davis took the envelope containing the tubes of 
defendant's blood, together with similar envelopes containing blood 
samples from the other blood draws performed that morning to his 
home where he placed them in a specifically-designated bottom 
drawer in his refrigerator. 
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156. Mr. Davis1 refrigerator and the drawer in which Mr. Davis 
stores the blood sample envelopes are not locked. 
157. Mr. Davis' wife and children have access to the 
refrigerator drawer; however, Mr. Davis has instructed all of his 
family members never to open the drawer containing the envelopes. 
158. No food is kept in the designated drawer. 
159. Subsequently, Mr. Davis transferred the envelope holding 
the defendant's blood samples to the State Laboratory where Mr. 
Beck took custody of the blood samples. 
160. Mr. Davis testified, based on his various inspections of 
the envelope which held the defendant's blood sample, that at no 
time during which he had custody of the defendant's blood samples 
was there any indication whatsoever that the seal of the envelope 
had been tampered with or come off, that either of the tubes had 
broken or leaked, that the identifying labels on the packages had 
shifted or come off, and that when he transferred the envelope to 
Mr. Beck the envelope was in the exact same condition it was when 
the envelope was sealed at Pioneer Valley Hospital. 
161. No evidence was presented to suggest that while the blood 
was in the custody of Mr. Davis that the envelope containing the 
sealed tubes of the defendant's blood had been tampered with. 
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162. No evidence was presented to suggest any bad faith on the 
part of the State in Mr. Davis' handling of the blood sample taken 
from the defendant. 
TESTING OF THE STATE-ANALYZED BLOOD 
163. Mr. Beck personally received from Mr. Davis the sealed 
envelope containing the two tubes of defendant's blood on November 
16, 1995, at 3 p.m. 
164. Mr. Beck is employed by the Utah State Division of 
Laboratories as a toxicologist. 
165. Mr. Beck has a Bachelor of Science degree in chemistry, 
a Bachelor of Science degree in pharmacy and approximately 23 years 
of on-the-job experience. 
166. Mr. Beck is a member of the Society of Forensic 
Toxicologists and a Diplomate of the American Board of Forensics 
Toxicology. 
167. The parties stipulated that Mr. Beck is an expert for the 
purposes of the suppression hearing. 
168. Upon receipt of the defendant's blood samples, Mr. Beck 
prepared the samples for testing and then placed the samples in the 
refrigerator in the evidence room of the State Laboratory. 
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169. The evidence room is not open to the public and is locked 
unless staff are present in the room. 
170. Later in the afternoon that day at 4:55 p.m., Mr. Beck 
tested the defendant's blood samples for the presence of ethanol, 
which is normal drinking alcohol. 
171. Mr. Beck used a testing device known as a gas 
chromatograph ("GC") to analyze the defendant's blood for ethanol. 
172. The GC equipment used by Mr. Beck to analyze the 
defendant's blood is considered to be the standard machine used by 
toxicologists to determine the presence of ethanol in blood. 
173. Quality controls are used in the GC testing process to 
ensure that the equipment is working properly. 
174. Quality controls are used before, during and following 
the testing of blood samples. 
175. The quality controls used before, during and after the GC 
testing of the defendant's blood indicated that the GC equipment 
was functioning within acceptable tolerances. 
17 6. The GC equipment at the State Laboratory has 50 
carousels, which enables the analysis of multiple blood samples on 
one run. 
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177. The results of the GC analysis of each blood sample 
tested correspond to each numbered carousel in which a blood sample 
is placed. 
178. Two tests were performed on each of defendant's blood 
samples. 
179. The results of the analysis of the defendant's blood 
indicated 0.13 grams of ethanol per 100 milliliters of blood. 
CHAIN OF CUSTODY AND TESTING OF THE HOSPITAL-ANALYZED BLOOD 
180. On November 14, 1995, Cindy Sadler ("Nurse Sadler") was 
employed as a registered nurse by Pioneer Valley Hospital and was 
involved in the blood draw of the defendant. 
181. As of November 14, 1995, Nurse Sadler had an Associate 
Degree from Weber State College. 
182. Nurse Sadler has worked as a registered nurse for 
eighteen years. 
183. Nurse Sadler is not aware of a specific policy at Pioneer 
Valley Hospital regarding the analysis of alcohol in people 
involved in accidents; however, Nurse Sadler is aware that the 
hospital does ask for analysis of alcohol in the blood of people 
involved in accidents. 
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184, After Mr. Davis drew two tubes of blood for the State, 
either he or Nurse Sadler drew three more tubes for use by the 
hospital. 
185. Nurse Sadler received the hospital's three tubes of 
defendant's blood. 
18 6. Nurse Sadler then copied the defendant's name and 
identifying information from his hospital armband onto labels 
which, in turn, she placed on each of the three blood tubes. 
187. Nurse Sadler also placed her initials, "CS," on each of 
the three tubes. 
188. Nurse Sadler then sent the three tubes to the Pioneer 
Valley Hospital Laboratory for analysis. 
189. On November 14, 1995, Stanley R. Hardy ("Mr. Hardy") was 
employed as a medical technician in the Pioneer Valley Hospital 
Laboratory. 
190. Mr. Hardy's education, training and experience qualify 
him to perform the analysis of blood to determine the presence of 
ethyl alcohol. 
191. Mr. Hardy received the three tubes of defendant's blood 
and tested it on a Roche Mira machine. 
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192. The defendant does not challenge the chain of custody or 
the accuracy of the blood testing procedure of the defendant's 
hospital-analyzed blood. 
193. Mr. Hardy knew the two tubes contained the defendant's 
blood because the label on each tube indicating the defendant's 
name and hospital armband information matched the information on 
the defendant's order slip because the order slip also contained 
the defendant's name and identifying hospital armband information. 
194. The order slip tells him the test(s) he is to perform on 
the blood samples. 
195. Mr. Hardy also identified the initials "CS" that had been 
placed on the tubes by Nurse Sadler and his own initials, "SH, " 
that indicate who performed the test. 
196. Mr. Hardy ran the blood test on the defendant's blood. 
197. When the defendant's blood was tested, the machine was 
working properly and operating "within control." 
198. After running the test on the samples, Mr. Hardy received 
the test results and confirmed that the test results were from the 
blood drawn from the defendant. 
199. The results of the analysis of the defendant's blood 
indicated 141.7 milligrams of ethanol per deciliter of blood. 
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200. Point 7 (.7) milligrams per deciliter is the equivalent 
of 0.1417 grams per 100 milliliters. 
201. In opposition to the chain of custody, handling and 
storage procedures concerning the state-analyzed blood to which Mr. 
David and Mr. Beck testified, the defendant called as his expert 
witness, Dennis Crouch, a forensic toxicologist at the Center for 
Human Toxicology and Research. 
202. Mr. Crouch, who has impressive credentials as a forensic 
toxicologist, strongly criticized procedures like those followed by 
Mr. Davis and Mr. Beck pertaining to the defendant's blood, but 
which were put to him hypothetically by defense counsel. 
203. Among other things, Mr. Crouch testified regarding 
minimum guidelines jointly recommended by the Society of Forensic 
Toxicologists and the Toxicology Section of the American Academy of 
Forensic Sciences for laboratories engaged in medical/legal 
testing. 
204. Also according to Mr. Crouch, based on hypothetical 
questions put to him by defense counsel which were designed to 
track the procedures followed by Mr. Davis and Mr. Beck, minimum 
guidelines concerning chain of custody, security, documentation 
were not met, security procedures as posed to him were deficient, 
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distinctions between temporary and permanent storage areas of blood 
samples should have been made, blood samples should not have been 
tested in the same area in which they were stored and blood samples 
must be in the tester's line of sight or else be documented to be 
stored in a freezer or refrigerated container under lock. 
205. However, Mr. Crouch did not have any evidence to suggest 
that the tubes containing the defendant's blood had been tampered 
with in any way prior to be tested on the GC equipment. 
206. Mr. Crouch also agreed that his own lab receives blood 
mailed by U.S. mail delivery from other places in Utah that has 
been mailed in unrefrigerated containers. 
207. Finally, Mr. Crouch did not address the fact that 
notwithstanding the differences in the handling, storage and 
testing of the state-analyzed blood (which Mr. Crouch did 
criticize) and the hospital-analyzed blood procedures in this case 
(which the defendant did not challenge) , the state-analyzed results 
concluded that the defendant's blood alcohol level on November 14, 
1995, was 0.13 grams of ethanol per 100 milliliters of blood, and 
that the hospital-analyzed results found that the defendant's blood 
alcohol level on November 14, 1995, was .1417 grams of ethanol per 
100 milliliters of blood. If anything, the hospital-analyzed blood 
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test results themselves underscore the accuracy of the state-
analyzed blood test results and thereby affirm the reliability of 
the State's handling, storage and testing procedures of the 
defendant's blood samples. 
STATEMENTS ALLEGEDLY MADE BY THE DEFENDANT WHILE 
HOSPITALIZED AT THE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER 
208. Following some initial treatment and the blood draw on 
November 14, 1995, the defendant was transferred from Pioneer 
Valley Hospital to the University Medical Center ("UUMC"). 
209. Fairly soon after the defendant's admission to the UUMC 
on November 14, 1995, a UUMC representative contacted Deputy 
Stratford to tell him that the hospital had received threats 
against the defendant's life and that the hospital was concerned 
the defendant's family might remove him from the hospital against 
the hospital's wishes. 
210. In response, the defendant was provided protection by 
security guards, including deputies from the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Office, until he was released from the UUMC. 
211. The guards were stationed in the defendant's room also to 
ensure that the defendant did not leave the hospital. 
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DEPUTY BRAD HUNTER 
212. From approximately 3:00 p.m. until 5:30 p.m., November 
14, 1995, Deputy Brad Hunter ("Deputy Hunter7') was assigned to 
guard the defendant in his room at the UUMC. 
213. Deputy Hunter did not go to the UUMC to interrogate the 
defendant. 
214. Deputy Hunter neither interrogated the defendant nor 
asked him any specific questions. 
215. Deputy Hunter did not advise the defendant of his rights 
per Miranda while he was stationed in the defendant's room. 
216. When Deputy Hunter, in uniform, walked into the 
defendant's room, the defendant asked him why he was there. 
217. Deputy Hunter told the defendant he was there to keep the 
defendant at the hospital because the defendant had threatened to 
leave. 
218. According to Deputy Hunter, the defendant appeared to be 
"banged up" and "mentally okay but a little tired." 
219. While Deputy Hunter was present the defendant received no 
medical attention other than visits "every so often" by a nurse to 
"give blood checks." 
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220. Deputy Hunter and the defendant had a "general 
conversation" for approximately one hour of the two and a half 
hours he was in the defendant's room. 
221. Deputy Hunter recalled three statements made by the 
defendant which he subsequently included in his report. 
222. Except as discussed in Findings of Fact Nos. 223 and 226, 
there was no discussion concerning the collision or the defendant's 
possible involvement in the collision. 
223. The first remark spontaneously made by the defendant was 
that his (the defendant's) sister had seen him (the defendant) on 
the 12 o'clock news. 
224. The remark was not made in answer to any question. 
225. Deputy Hunter responded to the remark by telling the 
defendant he (Deputy Hunter) "didn't see it" and "didn't know much 
about what happened." 
226. Subsequently, after Deputy Stratford arrived, according 
to Deputy Hunter, at one point the defendant also spontaneously 
stated that he (the defendant) and some friends had been "driving 
a stolen '94...Ford Ranger extended cab," that he had "passed a cop 
car. And when he saw the cop car somebody told him to go, so he 
sped up and got approximately 75 miles an hour and went through the 
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red light. And that's when the accident happened." The defendant 
also said that if the accident had not happened, "he probably would 
have lost the cop." 
227. Deputy Hunter neither coerced nor tricked the defendant 
into making these statements. 
228. Before Deputy Hunter left, he and Deputy Stratford were 
together in the defendant's room for approximately five minutes. 
229. Deputy Hunter knew Deputy Stratford came to the 
defendant's room to "complete the investigation." 
230. Deputy Hunter is and has been a deputy in the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's office for approximately three and a half years. 
231. Deputy Hunter was a credible witness. 
DEPUTY LAWRENCE STRATFORD 
232. Shortly before 6:00 p.m. on November 14, 1995, Deputy 
Stratford arrived at the defendant's room at the UUMC. 
233. Deputy Stratford went to the UUMC initially "to find out 
the problem with the threats" and then decided "that while [he] was 
there [he] would try and obtain [the defendant's] side of the story 
to find out [the defendant's] version of what happened." 
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234. Deputy Stratford did not advise the defendant of his 
rights per Miranda while he was present in the defendant's hospital 
room. 
235. Deputy Hunter was present in the defendant's room when 
Deputy Stratford arrived. 
236. Deputy Stratford was in uniform when he came to the 
defendant's room. 
237. When Deputy Stratford arrived, the defendant was talking 
to Deputy Hunter. 
238. Deputy Stratford asked the defendant "if he remembered 
the accident so that [Deputy Stratford] could find out [the 
defendant's] side of the story." 
239. When Deputy Stratford arrived, the room's television was 
on. After Deputy Stratford asked the defendant if he remembered 
the accident, a television news story came on about the accident. 
240. Distracted by the news story, Deputies Stratford and 
Hunter turned to listen to it. 
241. At that time, according to Deputy Stratford, the 
defendant spontaneously stated that "he knew the car was stolen 
before the officer turned his lights on and they decided to run 
from him;" "the gun was loaded and that Kevin bought it;" and that 
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"he was just taking them home and knew nothing about the burglary 
earlier." 
242. The deputies themselves had turned to watch the news 
report and were not talking to the defendant when he made these 
statements. 
243. Deputy Stratford neither coerced nor tricked the 
defendant to make any statements. 
244. Although Deputy Stratford had asked a question about 
whether the defendant could remember the accident so that Deputy 
Stratford could fill out his version of events, the statement was 
not made in response to Deputy Stratford's question. 
245. Indeed, the question was not actually responsive to the 
question asked. 
24 6. Some of Deputy Stratford's testimony conflicted with some 
of his other testimony; however, he was, nevertheless, a credible 
witness. 
DEPUTY DIRK ROESLER 
247. On November 16, 1995, Deputy Dirk Roesler ("Deputy 
Roesler") went to the UUMC to guard the defendant. 
248. On November 16, the defendant was considered by law 
enforcement to be "in custody." 
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249. Deputy Roesler did not go to the UUMC to interrogate the 
defendant. 
250. Deputy Roesler did not interrogate the defendant while he 
(Deputy Roesler) was guarding the defendant. 
251. Deputy Roesler did not advise the defendant of his 
rights per Miranda while he was in the defendant's hospital room. 
252. Deputy Roesler indicated that at times the defendant 
appeared to be heavily medicated and groggy. 
253. Nevertheless, Deputy Roesler and the defendant were able 
to converse casually. 
254. They did not discuss the accident nor the defendant's 
part therein except as follows in Findings 255, 256 and 257. 
255. At one point, the defendant spontaneously expressed to 
Deputy Roesler that he feared for his (defendant's) safety and 
asked if there was anything Deputy Roesler could do to arrange for 
confinement outside of the county. 
256. In response, Deputy Roesler advised the defendant to 
consult with his attorney concerning the conditions of his 
confinement. 
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257. Notwithstanding Deputy Roesler's advice, the defendant 
continued to discuss the site of his confinement and then 
volunteered the statement, "I did it, I'm guilty as hell." 
258. Deputy Roesler neither coerced nor tricked the defendant 
to make any statement. 
259. Deputy Roesler has been in law enforcement with the Salt 
Lake County Sheriff's office since October 1991. 
260. Deputy Roesler was a credible witness. 
THE DEFENDANT'S MEDICAL CONDITION AND WHETHER ANY 
STATEMENTS BY HIM WERE MADE KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY 
261. While at the scene of the collision, the defendant was 
partially pinned under the truck and was not free to leave. 
262. Trooper Bairett had considerable probable cause evidence 
against the defendant to believe the defendant had been driving 
under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident. 
2 63. Trooper Bairett had considerable evidence to believe that 
the defendant caused the accident and that the accident was likely 
to cause at least one death. 
2 64. To Trooper Bairett the defendant appeared to be in shock. 
264. In view of all of the circumstances, Trooper Bairett 
asked the defendant questions which were likely to elicit 
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admissions from the defendant without first informing him of his 
Miranda rights. 
2 65. While at the UUMC, the defendant received medical 
treatment for his injuries resulting from the collision. 
266. At times during his hospitalization, the defendant 
appeared to be tired, groggy and medicated, it appears that 
throughout the day of November 14, his state of alertness improved 
and he was "pretty well" able to do what the nurses asked him to 
do. 
267. At the time the defendant allegedly made his 
incriminating statements to the officers, his medical condition 
did not appear to render him unable to make the statements to the 
officers knowingly and voluntarily. 
268. To the contrary, according to the officers, at each time 
the defendant volunteered one of these statements, the defendant 
had been engaged in casual conversations. 
269. Deputies Hunter, Stratford or Roesler neither tricked nor 
coerced the defendant into making incriminating statements. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes 
the following as a matter of law: 
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1. Trooper Bairettfs questions to the defendant at the scene 
of the collision at which time the defendant was partially pinned 
under the truck and in shock and which were made in the absence of 
a Miranda warning went beyond the investigatory stage and, 
therefor, are suppressed. 
2. The defendant should have been advised of his rights per 
Miranda when Trooper Bairett proceeded to interrogate the defendant 
about his driving the pickup and why he had run from Trooper 
Bairett. 
3. The defendant, despite his actions and lack of 
objections, did not expressly consent to the blood draw by Mr. 
Davis. 
4. Because no search warrant authorizing the blood draw had 
been obtained prior to the blood draw and because the defendant was 
not under arrest, three factors must be satisfied for the blood 
draw to pass constitutional muster: first, the draw itself must be 
performed in a reasonable and safe manner. With regard to this 
factor, it is undisputed that the draw was performed in a 
reasonable and safe fashion. 
Second, probable cause must be exist for the draw and known to 
the officer (s) who directs that a blood draw be conducted. 
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Third, exigent circumstances must be present to conduct the 
search without a search warrant. 
5. Trooper Bairett, Sergeant Craig and Deputy Stratford 
each had probable cause to believe the defendant had operated the 
pickup while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage and, 
thus, could direct a blood draw. 
7. Trooper Bairett, having probable cause to believe the 
defendant had operated the pickup while under the influence of 
alcohol, did radio Dispatch and request help, including someone to 
help with the defendant's blood draw. 
8. Deputy Roberts, the law enforcement official who 
witnessed the blood draw, also had independent probable cause to 
order the procedure. 
9. To prevent the dissipation of evidence of ethanol in an 
individual's system is a recognized exigent circumstance. 
10. The chain of custody of the blood drawn by Mr. Davis and 
maintained by the State of Utah was not defective; the blood tubes 
had not, prior to being tested, been tampered with in any way and 
the State did not exhibit any bad faith in the handling, storage or 
testing of the blood. 
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11. The chain of custody of the state-analyzed blood evidence 
was sufficient. 
12. The handling, storage and testing procedures for the 
state-analyzed blood did not affect the accuracy of the blood 
samples. 
13. The testing procedures for the defendant's state-analyzed 
blood were appropriate, accurate and reliable. The testing 
equipment is standard for blood alcohol testing and the machine was 
calibrated and working properly before, during and after the test. 
14. The State established an appropriate chain of custody of 
the hospital-analyzed blood, and the defendant does not contest 
this chain of custody. 
15. It is unclear whether it was Mr. Davis or Nurse Sadler 
who drew the three additional tubes of the defendant's blood. 
However, under the totality of the circumstances, the reason these 
three additional tubes of blood were drawn related solely to the 
defendant's medical treatment and, therefor, does not constitute an 
unconstitutional search of the defendant. 
16. Rule 506(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence is an exception 
to the physician-patient privilege and provides that no 
physician-patient privilege exists as to information obtained by 
0 M \) u 
STATE V. RIGGS PAGE FORTY-SIX FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
examination of the patient relevant to an issue of the physical 
condition of the patient in any proceeding in which that condition 
is an element of any claim in any proceedings in which any party 
relies upon the condition as an element of the claim. In the 
instant case, the State of Utah relies on the defendant's blood 
alcohol content as an element of its claims that he committed three 
counts of Criminal Homicide, Automobile Homicide. Because the 
blood draw itself was a constitutional search, the results of the 
hospital-analyzed blood testing are otherwise admissible under Rule 
506(d). 
17. The defendant was in custody at all times while he was at 
the UUMC. 
18. Although the defendant could have been arrested prior to 
7:30 p.m., November 16, 1995, the investigation was ongoing prior 
to that time. 
19. The law enforcement officers knew the defendant was to 
remain in the hospital and that he was not going to leave the 
hospital. They were not obligated to arrest the defendant prior to 
his actual arrest. 
20. None of the conversations between the defendant and 
Deputies Hunter, Stratford and Roesler constituted interrogations 
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nor did the deputies employ coercion or trickery to elicit 
incriminating statements from the defendant. 
21. All of the incriminating statements made by the defendant 
to Deputies Hunter, Stratford and Roesler were spontaneous and 
voluntary. 
22. At the times the defendant made his incriminating 
statements to Deputies Hunter, Stratford and Roesler, he made the 
statements knowingly and voluntarily; his medical condition did not 
render him incapable of making those statements knowingly and 
voluntarily. 
DATED this 28th day of June, 1996. 
Qu-^n 
ANNE M. STIRBA 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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